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1 Constraints on the judicial role
“On the consciences of the judges depends the justice of the Court's decisions.”
1
In an effort to explain impartiality and bias within the Court, studies using
a variety of different approaches from virtually every area of the social
sciences—psychology, sociology, and political theory amongst them—have
attempted to discern the extent of the judges' bias.2 All of these studies rest
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1 Speech made by President Guerrero at the Inaugural Sitting of the International Court of
Justice (18 April 1946), (1946-47) ICJ Yearbook, at 38.
2 See for example T.O. Elias, `Report: Does the International Court of Justice, as it is Presently
Shaped, Correspond to the Requirements which Follow from its Functions as the Central
Judicial Body of the International Community?', in H. Mosler and R. Bernhardt (eds), Judicial
Settlement of International Disputes (Springer, 1974), at 19; E. Posner andM. de Figureido, `Is the
International Court of Justice Biased?', (2005) 34 JLS 599; E.B. Weiss, `Judicial Independence
and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry', in L.F. Damrosch (ed), The International Court of
Justice at a Crossroads (Transnational, 1987), at 123 [hereinafter `Brown Weiss']; A. Rovine,
`The National Interest and the World Court', in L. Gross (ed), The Future of the International
Court of Justice (Oceana, 1976), at 313 (although he was suggesting how the United States
could leverage bias within the Court to further its national interest); G. Terry, `Factional
Behaviour on the International Court of Justice: An Analysis of the First and Second Courts
Copyright © the Author(s).
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on a basic premise, that bias and partiality are two characteristics anathema to
the judicial robe. So goes this argument, the essence of the adjudicator's role, in
addition to fulfilling the role of an impartial third party resolving disputes, is to
avoidwriting personal predilections, biases and prejudices into the law that they
are entrusted to administer and safeguard or surrendering to considerations of
personal or political expediency.3 This line of reasoning is surely sound: if the
judicial role, whether domestic or international, involves in some measure to
alleviate, mediate, resolve or otherwise decide disputes between parties, surely
it is appropriate to demand some basic impartiality from judges in relation to
the law, in that a judge can be entrusted to adjudicate conscientiously and in
adherence with the nature of judicial work within a given legal order.4
Scholarly treatment of the question of impartiality has raised another is-
sue: that, because nationality or geography inevitably constitute overriding in-
fluences on international judges, bias is inevitable.5 That claim remains prob-
(1945-1951) and the Sixth and Seventh Courts (1961-1967)', (1975) 10Melbourne University Law
Review 59; I. Ro Suh, `Voting Behaviour of National Judges in International Courts', (1969)
63 AJIL 224 [hereinafter `Suh']; T. Ginsburg, `Bounded Discretion in International Judicial
Lawmaking', (2005) 45 Va. J. Int'l L.631 [hereinafter: `Ginsburg']; J. Katz Cogan, `Competition
and Control in International Adjudication', (2008) 48 Va. J. Int'l L. 411; T. Hensley, `National
Bias and the International Court of Justice', (1966) 12MJPS 568; W. Samore, `National Origins
v. Impartial Decisions: A Study of World Court Holdings', (1956) 34 Chicago-Kent LR 193
[hereinafter `Samore']. Cf. A.M. Smith, `Judicial Nationalism', (2005) 40 Tex. Int'l L.J 197
[hereinafter `Smith'], who uses the same methodology and refutes any idea of national bias;
and S. Schwebel, `National Judges and Judges ad hoc of the International Court of Justice',
(1999) 48 ICLQ 889 [hereinafter `Schwebel'], at 893-4.
3 See W.O. Douglas, `The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy', (1948) 32 Journal of the
American Judicial Society 106; and R.A. Cass, `Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective
Decision-Making', (1995) 75 Boston University Law Review 941, at 995 concluding that the
principal incentive for judges is to adhere to professional norms ``in order tomaintain respect
within the profession, to deflect criticism, and to conform to the judge's own expectations.''
4 F. Mégret, `International Judges and Experts? Impartiality and the Problem of Past Declara-
tions', (2011) 10 LPICT 31, at 42-3. The Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the Interna-
tional Judiciary (published in 2004 by the Project on International Courts and Tribunals at Uni-
versity College London, and available at <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/docs/burgh_fin
al_21204.pdf> [last accessed 30 August 2012]) attempt to entrench a notion of impartiality
and independence for international judges more generally.
5 E.A. Posner and J.C. Yoo, `Judicial Independence in International Tribunals', (2005) 93 Cal.
L. Rev 1, at 8, suggest that decision-making in international courts would be more effective
once the vested interests of the judges are acknowledged and accepted. But cf. M. Minow,
`Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges
and Jurors', (1992) 33 William and Mary Law Review 1201, at 1207-8 who argues forcefully
for the need to distinguish one's identity and perspectives, based on race, ethnicity, class
or gender, from one's ability to judge impartially: ``if being implicated means bias, then
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lematic, as it advocates a subjectivist analysis of judicial behaviour that is in-
complete. By restricting partiality to the circular claim that ``since [judicial de-
cisions are] made by men who, in their attitudes, proclivities, and intellectual
tendencies, are to a significant degree products of the environments that relate
them to local and national systems of social values, there can be no men impar-
tial in disputes between States'',6 more important constraints are overlooked.
Although factors such as national loyalty, the selection process, the manner in
which judges align themselves into voting blocs on the bench and questions of
procedural fairness7 could surely prove important considerations if empirically
cognisable, there is no evidence that the Court's judges systematically `vote their
preferences' or are instructed by their governments.8
Divining the reasons for judicial behaviour is a Sisyphean task riddled with
methodological concerns. First, it is virtually impossible to ascertain the truth
merely from interviews and constructed biographies without at least a degree
of speculation, as judges are bound by the veil of secrecy that protects their
deliberations; this might explain why a accurate scholarly treatment of judicial
behaviour is probably unattainable.9 Moreover, theories of judicial behaviour
based wholly on national bias remain incomplete, dismissing as they do other
important influences which are objectively discernible: training in a particular
legal tradition; professional training in diplomacy, government, or practice;
institutional loyalty; and even an individual's judge's conception of the judicial
everyone is biased, and perhaps then no one can judge.''
6 T. Franck, `Some Psychological Factors in International Third PartyDecision-Making', (1967)
19 Stan. L.R. 1217 [hereinafter `Franck']. See also Terris et al, The International Judge: An
Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World's Cases (OUP, 2007), at 209 who
concluded that ``not even the strictest insistence on judicial impartiality can separate a judge
entirely from his personal circumstances.''
7 Brown Weiss, supra note 2, at 124.
8 See response to Posner in R. Higgins, `Alternative Perspectives on the Independence of
International Courts: remarks', 99 ASIL Proc. 135; R. Higgins, `Reflections from the
International Court' in M. Evans (ed), International Law (OUP, 2006) 3, at 3: ``[c]ertainly the
international judge is not `responsible to' the particular States appearing before him/her. It
is totally inappropriate for a State to assume, still less to say, that a particular Judge's vote
in a case was due to his or her nationality (or race, or religion). Only those present in the
Deliberation Chamber can know what views were held, by whom, and on what grounds. In
fact, the dynamics of the legal exchanges between the Judges of the International Court in no
way reflect tired stereotypes. Assumptions based on such ideas would be surprisingly wide
of the mark.'' See also A. Chayes, `Nicaragua, The United States and the World Court', (1985)
85 Colum. L.Rev 1445, at 1447-8.
9 L.V. Prott, `The role of the judge of the International Court of Justice' (1974) 10 RBDI 473
[hereinafter `Prott'], at 473.
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function within the international legal order.10
In this respect, criticism of judges often rests on the appraiser's value-
system and his or her subjective understanding of the judicial function without
appreciating the complex manner in which a judge's particular judicial method-
ology and discipline also operate in shaping judicial decisions.11 This article
aims therefore to move beyond such subjective analyses, and will eschew mat-
ters of corruptibility and of national or political bias. It will also ignore the na-
tionality of the judges, the political interests of states, and questions relating to
the representation of different regions or legal traditions on the bench, leaving
these considerations to other authors.12 As an analysis of constraints incumbent
on international judges depends on far more than their personal history or psy-
chological profile, and is in fact the fruit of the unique constraints inherent in
the judicial role,13 this piece will focus on distilling those ``ordinarily unchal-
lengeable factors''14 which do operate upon the Court through the ``deliberately
10 O. Spiermann, International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice
(CUP, 2005) [hereinafter `Spiermann'], at 27. These factors might be considered as part of
the definition of a judge's `legal culture'. See L. Friedman, `The Concept of Legal Culture: A
Reply' in D. Nelken (ed.), Comparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot, 1997) 33, at 34: ``ideals, values,
expectations and attitudes towards law and legal institutions, which some public or some
parts of the public hold.''
11 See R. Dworkin, `The Judge's New Role: Should Personal Conviction Count?', (2003) 1 JICJ
4 [hereinafter `Dworkin']. For a comparative view of how this occurs within municipal legal
orders see Prott, supra note 9, at 474 arguing that judges internalise the expectations laid out
by external agents as their own personal standards of behaviour; and Franck, supra note 6,
at 1217 claiming that there exist subconscious and concealed impulses which predetermine
the result of the decision-making process of the international judge.
12 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Clarendon Press,
1933) [hereinafter Lauterpacht, Function of Law], at 211-5 is similarly dismissive of these
considerations, although see H. Lauterpacht, `Observations concerning the Report of Judge
Huber on Amendment of the Statute of the International Court of Justice', in H. Lauterpacht,
International Law: being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, Vol 5: Disputes, War and
Neutrality, Parts IX–XIV (CUP, 2004) 99 [hereinafter `Lauterpacht, Amendments'], at 100-105.
See also in the same volume H. Lauterpacht, `Contents for the Revision of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice', 114 [hereinafter `Lauterpacht, Revision'], where he
suggests various modifications to the selection process. For an interesting, albeit teleological
approach to these phenomena, seeM.Manouvel, Les opinions séparées à la Cour internationale:
un instrument de contrôle du droit international prétorien par les États (l'Harmattan, 2005)
[hereinafter `Manouvel'], at 170-215. See also R. Mackenzie and P. Sands, `International
Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge', (2002) 44 Harv.
Int'l L.J 271, at 280-2 for suggestions on safeguarding the impartiality and independence of
international judges.
13 R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Belknap Press, 1986), at 17-8, 401.
14 K. Malleson, `Safeguarding Judicial Impartiality', (2002) 22 Legal Studies 53, at 61 who lists,
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deliberative and reflective process''15 of judicial decision. Those factors include
the direct restrictions due to its institutional structure, concern for its prestige
and authority, whichmay also include concerns of individual members for their
legacy and reputation,16 whether what Lauterpacht calls a ``judicial idealism in-
tent upon extending the domain of law''17 exists, and concerns about the appear-
ance and form of impartiality. These influences are inherent in the adjudicative
discipline,18 and the reason for focussing on these particular constraints is that,
unlike subjectivist concerns that cannot be empirically identified, there is suf-
ficient evidence in the Court's institutional structure and procedure, as well as
occasionally in its own judgments, where such constraints manifest themselves.
As such, the preoccupation over impartiality within the Court remains live; and
elucidating how the Court understands impartiality remains an important con-
sideration in discerning how the Court understands its own judicial function.
inter alia, social and educational background, service or employment background or history,
political associations, and membership in certain bodies as such ``unchallengeable'' factors.
15 E.W. Thomas, The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and Principles
(CUP, 2005) [hereinafter `Thomas'], at 242.
16 A.-M. Slaughter and L. Helfer, `Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to
Professors Posner and Woo', (2005) 93 California Law Review 3 [hereinafter `Slaughter and
Helfer'], at 6. Slaughter and Helfer have articulated a theory of ``dependent adjudication''
which posits that several factors, inherent in the international legal order, require a system
in which independent tribunals are ``unlikely to overstep their bounds and are far more
likely to advance states'' long-term interests, and therefore are institutions with ``constrained
independence'', going so far as to call judges ``fiduciaries' of States' interests''. Ginsburg, supra
note 2, calls this ``bounded discretion.'' A not-dissimilar idea is advanced by K. Alter, `Agents
or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context', (2008) 14 EJIR 33, at 39-41
and 44-7 who argues that judges are ``trustees'' rather than agents, distinguished from the
latter by the relative independence and individual qualifications, but nevertheless acting ``on
behalf of'' States appointing them. Cf. Posner and Yoo, supra note 5, at 27 who transcend
arguments of partiality or bias simpliciter to claim that not only do international judges act
as conscious agents of their national State's interests, but that their actual function of ICJ
judges is to circumscribe and control the authority of theCourt's judgments. Methodological
difficulties permeate these claims of State dependence: ``it is the essence of being a judge to
be impartial and independent, and he or she publicly will not relinquish that role. To argue
otherwise without concrete evidence is to theorise on the basis of speculation.'' Unusually,
Cogan, supra note 2, at 415 argues that in fact, because States are unable to control judicial
decision-making, ``we need to think anew about how to maintain control over [international
courts].''
17 Lauterpacht, Function of Law, supra note 12, at 205. Lauterpacht explains that this tendency
``ceases to be legitimate when, in the pursuit of a progressive and ethical solution, judges
are driven to disregard a clear rule grounded in the practice of States and in the imperative
requirements of the stability of the law'', at 209.
18
Ibid., at 243.
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2 Defining impartiality
Despite the frequency with which judges are exhorted to be impartial, little
scholarship seems to have conceptualised the notion of impartiality, even at the
domestic level.19 It is true that impartiality is a difficult concept to articulate
from a legal standpoint, raising as it does the basic question: impartiality in
relation to what? Proximity to the question at hand has two facets: it may
either contaminate one's ability to be impartial, or in fact reinforce one's ability
to reason from expertise.20 More importantly, one's theory of justice, on
the conception of the `common good', and on the nature of law all inevitably
colour one's conception of impartiality. The classic jurisprudential debates
between Herbert Hart and Lon Fuller also led to diverging views on the judicial
function and the role impartiality could play within it. Hart's argument, in the
main, was that that judicial impartiality could be realised by courts weighing
and balancing the competing interests of claimants,21 but only in the light
of valid legal rules—rules accepted as valid because they pass Hart's rules of
recognition—would form the reason for his/her judgment.22 Fuller, by contrast,
situated judicial impartiality differently: whilst certainly a judge was to remain
neutral among the moral positions embedded in the substantive law or rule
he/shemeant to apply, the judicial function required fidelity to the law's internal
morality in assessing the validity of such rules;23 impartiality thus took a
substantive dimension. As such, whilst their substantive directives to judges to
be impartial are much the same, the content of the term `impartiality' is rather
different.
The difficulties in defining the term with any certainty suggest that an
19 W. Lucy, `The Possibility of Impartiality', (2005) 25(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 3,
at 4 suggests that the notion of impartiality figures very sparingly in Anglo-American
jurisprudential work on adjudication, singling out especially Dworkin, supra note 13, at 234
and N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (OUP, 1978), who does not consider
the concept at any length.
20 M.Minow, `Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality
of Judges and Jurors', (1992) 33 William and Mary Law Review 1201, at 1204-5 points out that
the impartiality of being unfamiliar with issues of major importance may guard against
prejudice, but may lack the knowledge to distinguish between fact and the interpretation
given by parties' counsel.
21 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1994), at 205.
22
Ibid., 104. Hart's claim on the judiciary's reasons to be an internal statement on the validity
of law.
23 L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1969), at 130-1. By internal morality,
one would be advised to recall Fuller's eight desiderata for the effective existence of a legal
system, rather than any substantive or primary rules of law.
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understanding of impartiality cannot be discerned through any overarching
normative proposition, but is instead dependent on the context in which it is
invoked.24 For the Court, impartiality seems generally to be demanded in the
sense of judicial independence;25 this translates into acting ``independently of all
outside influence or interventions whatsoever, in the exercise of the judicial
function entrusted to it alone by the Charter and its Statute.''26 Defined as such,
it is essentially relational, and encompasses primarily procedural impartiality,
in that both parties are treated equally, and the outcome is wholly dependent
on the direct dispute.27 If one focuses specifically on the International Court's
practice, its relatively formalistic standards suggest a concern for adherence
primarily, if not exclusively, using this definition.28
A caveat: judicial decision-making at the Court cannot be fully understood
purely by reference to formal attributes of the institution; although these may
be crucial to understanding its judicial function, regard must be had for the
functions attributed to the individual judges themselves. In this respect, a
Member of the International Court exercises a function somewhat distinct
from that of the Court itself. From an adjudicatory perspective, the judge
is expected to uphold the function of the Court and the international legal
norms that body is bound to apply. However, rooted in the consensual and
arbitration-based history of international dispute settlement, there also exists
discernible pressure on judges to fulfil a certain representational role.29 Despite
24 Lucy, supra note 19, at 5.
25 See for example T.Meron, `Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal
Tribunals', (2005) 99(2) AJIL 359, at 359-60.
26
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding SC Res. 276, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 16, at 23, para.
29. See also M.J. Aznar Gómez, `Article 2', in Zimmermann et al (eds), The Statute of the
International Court of Justice: A Commentary (OUP, 2006), 205, at 209 who emphasises that
independence is to protect judges from any external pressures, so that they rely only on the
facts and the law.
27 To ensure `outcome impartiality' extrinsic factors, such as the needs and status of the parties
in dispute, past and present deeds unrelated to the immediate dispute, and the impact of the
outcome are to be ignored. See Lucy, supra note 19, at 8 and 17-21.
28 See for example Article 17(2) Statute of the International Court of Justice, as annexed to
the Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 1 UNTS xvi; UKTS 67 (1946), Cmd
7015 [hereinafter `ICJ Statute'], where judges are called upon to recuse themselves from a
particular case if they have previously taken part as ``agent, counsel, or advocate of one of the
parties, or as a member of a national or international court, or of a commission of enquiry, or
in any other capacity'' related to the case. As notes P. Couvreur, `Article 17', in Zimmerman,
supra note 26, 337, at 346 no member of the Court has ever been impugned with violating
this provision.
29 See R. Mackenzie et al, Selecting International Judges: Selecting International Judges: Principle,
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the emphasis on judicial independence and high qualifications stipulated in
Article 2 of the Statute,30 Article 9 embodies the notion that ``as a whole'', the
Court should ensure the representation of ``the main forms of civilization and
of the principal legal systems of the world.''31 This representational element
permeating the judicial role has raised, and continues to raise, concerns that
the role of the Court's judges is constrained: already during the time of the
PCIJ, Moore, Loder and Anzilotti cautioned that ``of all the influences to which
men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle''32
than that of national bias; that preoccupation underlies the exhortation towards
impartiality embodied in the judicial oath.33 That distinction, between judge
and judicial institution, permeates the discussion that follows below.
Process, and Politics (OUP, 2010), at 25 who argues that this is perhaps no different than in
domestic courts, where there is increasing demand that the judiciary ``needs to be broadly
reflective of the make-up of society in order for it to command public confidence and
maintain political legitimacy as an unelected institution of power''. It should be noted that
considerations of ``representation'' on the domestic plane turn primarily on ethnicity, gender
and socio-economic status. See for example Lucy, supra note 19, at 15-6 referring to B.
Wilson, `Will Women Judges really make a Difference?', (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall Law Journal
507; and B. Hale, `Equality and the Judiciary: Why Should We Want More Women Judges?',
(2001) (Autumn) Public Law 489.
30 According to Article 2 of the ICJ Statute, supra note 28, the Court shall be composed of a
body of ``independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of
high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries
for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence
in international law.''
31 Article 9 of the ICJ Statute, supra note 28, The exact terms in this provision came at the
insistence of Adatci ( Japan) in 1920: see PCIJ Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-verbaux of
the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16th-July 24th 1920, with Annexes (Van Langenhuysen Bros,
1920) [hereinafter Procès-verbaux'], at 118, 136, 168; nationality was obviously an important
silent consideration. G. Abi-Saab, `Ensuring the Best Bench: Ways of Selecting Judges:
Presentation by Professor Georges Abi-Saab', in C. Peck and L. Roy (eds), Increasing the
Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice: Proceedings of the ICJ/UNITAR Colloquium to
Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Court (Nijhoff, 1997), at 168 resolves the ``whiff (soupcon)
of contradiction'' between the two provisions by emphasising that the representational
qualities stipulated in Article 9 are in regard to the legal systems of the world rather than
judges' national States.
32 Report of Judges Loder, Moore, and Anzilotti to the Permanent Court (2 September 1927),
PCIJ Series E No 4 (1927-28), at 75.
33 Article 20 of the ICJ Statute, supra note 28, provides that ``[e]very member of the Court shall,
before taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his
powers impartially and conscientiously.''
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3 Certain constraints on judicial behaviour
3.1 Legal education and training; views on the
function of law
Legal education and training constitute a constraint upon both domestic
and international judges, who are institutionally ``conditioned in such a way
as to virtually preclude the possibility of stepping outside the bounds of
legitimate judicial reasoning''.34 Judges also demonstrate loyalty to their oath of
impartiality, characterised as ``sacred'' by Lauterpacht, who considered judicial
impartiality a conscious decision to assume the moral duty of ``the enlightened
consideration of the paramount interest of peace and justice entrusted to the
care of judges.''35
As mentioned earlier, besides the obligation to remain impartial, Article
9 also suggests that within the Court, there should be representation of the
``main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world.''36
From the outset, these provisions aimed to reflect the ``distinct forms of legal
education'' through which one could approach a unified public international
law.37 This seems borne out in practice: there appears to exist a remarkable
intellectual homogeneity amongst the judges, onewhich transcends their varied
origins.38 Though this in no way implies universality of thought, the extent to
whichWestern conceptions of public international law and the judicial function
34 Thomas, supra note 15, at 245.
35 Lauterpacht, Function of Law, supra note 12, at 215. Lauterpacht argued that although
international judges can act impartially, institutional steps should be taken to ensure said
impartiality, primarily through the proscription of any factors of national representation,
especially taking issue with the institution of the judge ad hoc, which he criticised as
possessing a ``fatal lack of rationality'', at 233-6. He also freely acknowledged that ``by
birth, training, and community of sentiment and interest'', judges belonged to one particular
section of a population, at 216-7.
36 Although, as S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-1996, Vol. 1
(Nijhoff, 1997) [hereinafter `Rosenne, Law and Practice'], at 367 concludes, the substance of
Article 9 is hardly to impose an obligation on the electors, and there is no obligation on
States.
37 B. Fassbender, `Article 9', in Zimmermann, supra note 26, 261, at 267. In practice, ``diversity''
seems to be ensured through a convention whereby the Court's composition broadly
resembles that of the Security Council, with a ``tradition'' that its permanent members also
are continually represented on the bench.
38 An unpublished memorandum prepared by former Registrar Hambro for the ASIL Study
Panel on the Future of the International Court of Justice was reprinted in E. Gordon,
`Observations on the independence and impartiality of the Members of the International
Court of Justice', (1987) 2 Connecticut Journal of International Law 397 [hereinafter `Gordon'],
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permeate their legal training is remarkable, to the point where distinction
between Western and non-Western judges on the basis of their expressed
legal reasoning is impossible.39 The duopoly of English and French as the
Court's sole working languages perhaps compounds the problem,40 and might
partly explain why all of the current judges—and the vast majority of its
past judges—have read law in universities in the United States, the United
Kingdom or France.41 Doubtless there is great diversity in the perception
of the judicial function within even those three traditions: the distinction
between the civil law traditions and common law traditions embodied by
these three jurisdictions could be argued to be broadly representative of a
fair, if not universal, sampling of States.42 Yet overall, if one moves away
from pure geographical representation and considers other factors, the reputed
at 407. Hambro argued that ``[ Judges] are to apply international law, but even international
law is taught differently and applied differently in different countries according to the legal
systems prevailing … Nobody can doubt that the judges in applying such principles are
influenced by their backgrounds. … This explains sufficiently why the voting at times looks
as if it goes according to nationality; but this does not in any way even remotely imply that
the judges receive any kind of intimation, let alone instructions, from their governments on
how they should vote.''
39 L.V. Prott, `The Style of Judgment in the International Court of Justice', (1970-1973) Aust.
YBIL 82. See also R. Hoffman and T. Laubner, `Article 57', in Zimmermann, supra note 26,
at 1211 who claim that any distinctions between the judges having existed within the Court
(i.e. developed/developing States) have become much less apparent since the early 1990s;
and M. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (Grotius Publications, 1997), at 204. The
reverse was true regarding Soviet (although not Polish) judges during the Cold War. See for
example Z.L. Zile, `A Soviet Contribution to International Adjudication: Professor Krylov's
Jurisprudential Legacy', (1964) 58 AJIL 359, at 381; and K. Grzybowski, `Socialist Judges in the
International Court of Justice', (1964) 3 Duke Law Journal 536.
40 For further consideration of the intricate relation between linguistic competence and legal
concepts see G.I. Hernández, `On Multilingualism in the International Legal Process', in H.
Ruiz-Fabri et al (eds), Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, Volume 2
(Hart, 2010) 441. Mackenzie, supra note 29, at 82, note that the relatively confined choice
of official languages in fact constrains the candidate pool in States where neither of these
is spoken as an official language, thus further narrowing the possibilities only to those
candidates who have had the opportunity to become competent in one of the two official
languages.
41 Of the present fifteen judges, six studied or researched postgraduate law in the United
Kingdom (five at Cambridge), five in the United States (three at Harvard) and three in France
(two at Paris). Judge Yusuf, the lone judge neither to have studied nor have taught in one
of these three States, completed his doctorate at HEI-Geneva, an institution very closely
connected to the French international legal tradition.
42 As Fassbender, supra note 37, at 275 summarises, in practice this means the influence of legal
systems based on English common law and on Roman civil law, with Islamic law traditions
are also generally represented. See also Mackenzie, supra note 29, at 41-3, who express
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diversity of the bench takes on a different cast: the homogeneity of their legal
training arguably conditions their adherence to a specific vision of the judicial
role, establishing common shared assumptions which serve to integrate their
contribution in amanner that will persuade and appeal to, or at least not affront,
their colleagues.43
3.2 Conceptions of institutional propriety and
`belonging'
Judges have a keen sense of their own participation in upholding the function of
the court of which they are a member; and they inevitably perceive themselves
as ``part of an institution and an ongoing legal process that began well before
them and that will continue long after they have gone.''44 This sense of
continuity and institutional belonging is entrenched and formalised by the
collective drafting process of the Court, creating a sense of collective loyalty
where each judge will strive to meet the individual and collective expectations
of their colleagues in respect of their expectations of the judicial role and that
of a member of the institution.45 In ``complete equality'' with their peers,46
judges ad hoc are held to the same standard, although the specific nature of that
institution creates a somewhat different expectation of their role, which will
not be explored here.47
Consistent with the sense of institutional propriety and belonging is the
sense by judges of their own individual function. As Theodor Meron has
suggested, any person accepting international judicial office must accept ``the
values, the duties, and the instincts of one who holds such an office.''48 There
is doubtless heterogeneity in these self-perceptions, with divergence in judges'
concerns about the neglect of other systems at the expense of these systems; but cf. Rosenne,
Law and Practice, supra note 36, at 397 decrying the heterogeneity of the Court as a possible
cause of unpredictability in litigation.
43 E. McWhinney, The International Court of Justice and the Western Tradition in International
Law (Nijhoff, 1987), at 151, applauds this homogenization as part of an ``internationalising,
universalising force'' in international society.
44 Thomas, supra note 15, 246.
45
Ibid., at 247. See also Cass, supra note 3, at 970-2.
46 Article 31 ICJ Statute, supra note 28.
47 See G.I. Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (OUP,
forthcoming 2013), Chapter V, where an expanded version of this present article will further
explore the role of the judge ad hoc.
48 Meron, supra note 25, at 360.
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perceptions of the role of the Court in law-making, for example,49 and with
some judges arguably even defining their role in opposition to the institution
of which they form a part.50 Yet, for all this, some broad-brush, basic notions
of a judge's role can be identified.51 A judge is held to decide a case in
line with a correct or `proper' interpretation of the applicable law: in short,
deciding similar cases consistently with other decisions and more general legal
principles.52 In line with this requirement, a judge is called upon to strive to
decide in a principled, objective manner,53 with the absence of prior emotional
attachment to a given case, either by direct personal interest or through
strong political or ideological views that would predetermine the outcome.54
Frédéric Mégret calls this a dédoublement, the ability of the individual to reduce
him/herself to the function of the judge, and to limit the subjectivity of the
person.55
An interesting area in which institutional propriety may have imposed itself
is in relation to gender balance on the bench. Given the paucity of female
representation on international benches generally, efforts have been made in
other courts to ensure a more appropriate gender balance,56 with the view
49 Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 668 argues that many international judges will have internalised a
limited conception of their law-creating role. See also Declaration, Separate Opinion ( Judge
Simma) in Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America),
Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, p. 161, 324, at 325, inveighing against the ``inappropriate
self-restraint'' of his colleagues in addressing the legal limits on the use of force. In his
final Separate Opinion, this time in the Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
(Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v Greece), Judgment of 5 December 2011, Judge Simma
characterised theCourt's abstinence in clarifying the legal status of the exception non adimpleti
contractus rule a ``transactional'' approach (para. 6), and as a form of ``haptophobia'' (fear of
being touched) (para. 7).
50 It is true that the occasional `great dissenter' appears within the Court, who consciously casts
him or herself in the role of challenging the institution from within, and calling it to account
for failing to conform with that judge's expectations of the judicial role. That role seems
presently to be occupied by Judge Cançado Trindade, whose lengthy dissenting opinions
regularly exceed the length of the Court's own judgments.
51 See for example B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press, 1921),
at 12-3.
52 Lucy, supra note 19, at 23, calls this principle of treating like cases alike a ``bulwark against
partiality'', as it imposes a burden on a court to explain why a putatively similar case is not
actually sufficiently legal similar to the current case, and that burden at least makes improper
partiality more difficult than it might otherwise be.
53 Cass, supra note 3, at 947-8.
54 As Mégret, supra note 4, at 44 points out, obvious ethnic, racial or religious biases would
figure amongst such predispositions.
55
Ibid.
56 See for example Article 36(8)(a)(iii) of the Rome Statute for the Establishment of an Interna-
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put forward that this would ensure that certain values are considered by the
bench. In some respects, this might be true: certainly a feminist approach
to law and legal reasoning might yield different judicial outcomes, inasmuch
as the law sometimes contains aspects of context or situation which do not
address the specific concerns of the feminist critique.57 But that is altogether a
different assertion than claiming that the mere presence of women necessarily
modifies judicial reasoning. For example, it can safely be asserted that a
consciously gendered approach to international law is wholly absent in the
long line of case law in which the Court's first female judge, Dame Rosalyn
Higgins, participated in or presided over.58 Although generalisations based on
Judge Higgins' tenure are incautious, given her singular role for many years,59
the recent election of additional women judges—Xue Hanquin, Joan Donoghue
tional Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, which requires that each gender be represented by
no less than one third of the bench, or Article 12(2) of the Protocol on the African Court of
Human and People's Rights, OAUDoc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (9 June 1998),
which contains a more general exhortation.
57 See for example the study by R. Hunter et al, The Feminist Judgments (Hart, 2010), where
several well-known judgments in English law have been drafted from a consciously gendered
perspective; and S. Sherry, `The Gender of Judges', (1986) 4 Law and Inequality 159, who
examines the different claim that women judges reason differently from men. But cf. the
observation by H. Charlesworth and C. Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A
Feminist Analysis (Manchester University Press, 2000), at 81-2 concluding with rue, that the
international legal training ofwomen conditions them to think about law no differently from
men; and that in any event, the practice of collective drafting is such that it would reduce the
scope of alternative or controversial approaches in the majority opinions.
58 This is surely intentional. In the words of Judge Higgins herself: ``Men sometimes speak
about women having more intuition and so forth. I don't accept that. I think we're either
smart lawyers or not smart lawyers; we either know a lot or we don't know a lot. Gender
has nothing to do with it. In the international criminal field some of the women judges say it
really does make a difference whether you're a woman judge when you're looking at issues of
rape and so forth. I cannot stand in their shoes, and disagreewith them. But at the same time I
like to think that both sexes are equally appalled at such things. And coming back to the work
of the International Court of Justice, I cannot believe that anything I've said about where I
think a border runs, or a use of force has occurred, or a resource belongs to one State or the
other, has anything to do with gender. Nothing!'' The full transcript of the interview can be
found at <http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/2011/12/interview-with-prof-rosalyn-higgins>
[last accessed 30 August 2012].
59 In fact, as Malleson et al, supra note 14, at 163, have calculated, if expressed in female and
male ``court years'', over the period of ICJ history until Judge Higgins' retirement in February
2009, there have been fifteen female years compared to nine-hundred and forty-five male
years. Even when States have been given a choice to nominate a woman as judge ad hoc, they
have only elected to do so twice: Suzanne Bastid was nominated by Tunisia in Application
for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case Concerning the
Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 192, at
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and Julia Sebuntinde—may yield more possibilities for scholarly treatment of
the question of gender balance and whether it may influence or modify judicial
behaviour at the Court.60
3.3 Wider external community expectations
The Court's judges are obliged to pay heed to the expectations of States and
the wider United Nations framework.61 In the early days of the Court, then-
President Basdevant admitted candidly that its docket would be dependent on
governments, the political organs of the UN, and the decisions that these might
choose to bring before it.62 Efforts weremade from the outset to separate nomi-
nations from States, placing the process with the four members of the `national
group' of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which nominates a candidate
under Article 4 of the Statute.63 Even though the national group is not recom-
mended to consult States under Article 6 of the Statute,64 they remain central
throughout the entire process: they nominate the four members of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration; they finance and control the campaigning process;
and of course, it is States who cast final votes in the General Assembly and the
Security Council.65 Moreover, whatever the merits of the election procedure,66
194, para. 6; and Christine van der Wyngaert was nominated by Belgium in Arrest Warrant
of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 3,
at 6, para 3.
60 The sentiment in other international courts with more experience with female judges
suggests that gender equality is perceived with some ambivalence. See for example
Mackenzie et al, supra note 29, at 48-9.
61 But cf. L. Baum, Judges and their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior (Princeton
University Press, 2006), at 4 who claims that judges are sensitive to the ``regard'' of salient
audiences simply for the sake of that regard.
62 J. Basdevant, `The Judiciary in the International Sphere', (1949) (No 9) 7United Nations Bulletin
503.
63 Mackenzie and Sands, supra note 12, at 226.
64 But see P. Georget et al, `Article 6', in Zimmermann et al, supra note 26, at 250 suggesting
that consultation procedures with universities and learned international law societies seem
uneven at best.
65 The election process is carefully studied in Mackenzie et al, supra note 29, at 134, who
conclude that ICJ elections are not afforded special consideration for the fact that they are
high-level judicial vacancies, and instead seem increasingly ``ever more highly politicized'',
as with the general UN election system.
66 This was deliberate: see United Nations Organization Memorandum on the International
Court of Justice, 26 September 1945, F.O. 371/50947/U7369. Yet see P. Sands, `Global
Governance and the International Judiciary: Choosing our Judges', (2003) Current Legal
Problems 481, at 488-99 who studied records now in the public domain regarding the 1946,
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there is no formal supervisory mechanism in place to review whether candi-
dates for election meet the criteria provided for in Article 2.67 Thus, nominated
candidates will rarely hold views which are wholly irreconcilable with State
concerns.68 Furthermore, it has elsewhere been observed69 how the Court's
judges' career paths prior to election are relatively homogenous, with candi-
dates primarily drawn from the diplomatic corps70 or civil service of States,
from academia, and, to a diminishing degree relative to the early days of the
Permanent Court, from national judiciaries.71 In fact, many nominated candi-
1954 and 1960 elections of LordMcNair, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
to recall the British Foreign Office's extensive contact with the national group in matters of
nomination and selection. From the outset, the Foreign Office saw its role as ``to persuade
tactfully [its] national group to accept guidance'' from the British Government. See also S.
Rosenne, `The Composition of the Court', in L Gross (ed), The Future of the International Court
of Justice, Vol. 2 (Oceana, 1976), 377, at 386-7 recounting similar challenges to the election
process in 1972; and E. McWhinney, `Law, Politics and `Regionalism' in the Nomination and
Election of World Court Judges', (1986) 13 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce
1, at 4.
67 Lauterpacht, `Amendments', supra note 12, at 103.
68 R. Mackenzie and P. Sands, `Judicial Selection for International Courts', in K. Malleson and
P.H. Russell (eds), Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power (University of Toronto Press,
2007) 213, at 217. See E. Voeten, `The Politics of International Judicial Appointments', (2009)
9(2) Chicago Journal of International Law 387, at 391 who suggested that States may wish to do
any of the following: to increase the credibility of that State in relation to a certain cause or
institution; may be motivated by the ``distributive implications'' of court judgments; may be
influenced by norms of what an appropriate judge should be; and may be using international
judicial appointments as a form of patronage. The latter point, whilst controversial, cannot
be wholly discounted. See Mackenzie et al, supra note 29, at 2-3 who express concern with
the ``potentially distorting effects'' the political element of judicial selection can have on
meritorious and independent candidates. Their empirical study of the ICJ and the ICC
attempts to test the validity of criticisms of the process of international judicial appointments
more generally.
69 But cf. Aznar Gómez, `Article 4', in Zimmerman et al, supra note 26, at 216-8, pointing out the
``secondary tasks'' of many of the individuals later elected to the Court, with jurisconsults
often also acting in private practice or representing their State abroad.
70 See Abi-Saab, supra note 31, at 168 who refers to a ``legal diplomat'' as a person who has
studied international law, yet, without being a ``jurisconsult, practises it primarily through
the fora of multilateral diplomacy.''
71 Although many of the Court's judges have taught in universities, many in distinguished
capacities, of the present bench, only Judge Keith, Judge Bhandari and Judge Sebuntinde
have served as domestic judges in their national States. This is in fact an increase, as during
the 2009-2012 triennium, Judge Keith was the only judge who could be so characterised.
Conversely, generally more than half (of the present bench, President Tomka, Vice-President
Sepúlveda-Amor, and Judges Owada, Abraham, Skotnikov, Xue, and Donoghue) have
previously served in their national State's foreignministry or diplomatic corps. Mackenzie et
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dates spend extended periods serving in or close to their foreign ministries72
or, in the case of academics, have often spent long periods being of counsel
to governments on questions of international law.73 At the very least, candi-
dates rely on the support of their national State, which must invest consider-
able political capital in the campaign process.74 Accordingly, by the time they
are nominated, their career path will already have ``sensitized them to be espe-
cially mindful of the prerogatives of national sovereignty.''75 This being the case,
the selection process therefore guarantees a certain community of sentiment
on the bench,76 qualitatively different from the putative universalism imposed
al, supra note 29, at 57-9 suggest that despite contested definitions of judicial independence,
States nevertheless feel comfortable putting forward diplomats for high judicial office due
to their representational capacity and their negotiating experience.
72 Rosenne, supra note 66, at 391 posits that the high proportion of judges who occupied the
position of Legal Adviser to their foreign ministries puts them in delicate positions, given
that such the exercise of duties relating to that office invariably requires them to acquaint
themselves and form an opinion on most currently known international disputes prior to
their election to judicial office.
73 E. McWhinney, Les Nations Unies et la formation du droit (Pedone, 1986), at 124. Although he
wrote about the elections to the ILC, the process is identical to that for election to Court.
See also Samore, supra note 2, at 204-205 and Manouvel, supra note 12, at 210.
74 E. Jouannet, `Actualité des questions d'indépendance et d'impartialité des juridictions
internationales', in H. Ruiz-Fabri and J.M. Sorel (eds), Indépendance et impartialité des juges
internationaux (Pedone, 2010) 271, at 283.
75 T.M. Franck and P Prows, `The Role of Presumptions in International Tribunals', (2005) 4(2)
LPICT 197, at 238-9. This was argued specifically in the South West Africa case, supra note 26.
See W. Friedmann, `The Jurisprudential Implications of the South West Africa case', (1967) 6
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, at 3, who suggested that Judges Spender, Fitzmaurice
and Gros were particularly liable to such a view; and C.J.R. Dugard, `The Nuclear Tests Cases
and the South West Africa Cases: Some Realism About the International Judicial Decision',
16(3) VaJ Int'l L. 463 [hereinafter Dugard], at 494, who analysed the wider bench in 1966 to
conclude that a majority of the Court's judges had long histories of government service. Of
the present bench, all Members have performed one or more of the following functions:
represented their government as ambassador or other high representative; acted as counsel
for their national State in international adjudication, whether before the International Court
or another body; acted as legal officer to their foreign or justice ministry; or led a delegation
of their national State at a diplomatic conference.
76 Lauterpacht, Function of Law, supra note 12, at 217 refers to these as ``class interests'', although
he also states that they are rare, by virtue of the ``categorical imperative of duty'' and the
``powerful voice of justice''; and in Lauterpacht, `Amendments', supra note 12, at 102, and
Lauterpacht, `Revision', supra note 12, at 124-6, he emphasises instead that judges should be
experts in international law. Franck and Prows, supra note 75, at 242 claim that ICJ judges,
sharing a common and self-imposed perception of the limits of their craft, seek refuge from
politically or culturally freighted disagreements by way of ``neutered disagreements'' about
facts, thus leaving an important part of its work—``promoting growth of the law through
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by Article 9.77 This view is distinct from the argument that individual judges
are beholden to their State in an individual capacity,78 and it does not require
one to impugn the impartiality of members of the Court vis-à-vis their national
State (or any other). Even so, it suffices to observe that the judges, as a group,
are intellectually disposed to a legal reasoning broadly resembling that of the
State with whom they have the closest connection, and that such judges will
arrive at similar conclusions to the said States ``par affinité, parenté ou identité
intellectuelle.''79 Accordingly, one can identify objectively an intellectual affinity
of international judges with the policies of States, a wholly different argument
than that of institutional control by States over the work of international courts.80
Whilst compliance with ICJ judgments is generally considered high,81 the
continued activity of the Court depends on more than merely satisfying the
parties before it (or the requesting international organ); it also must contend
with potential and future disputes between States. Thus, the Court must not
only demonstrate a modicum of independence and impartiality when deciding
cases, but it must also demonstrate a view of substantive international law that
conceptualization and intellectual struggle''—undone.
77 Malleson et al, supra note 14, at 31 in conducting interviews with senior diplomatic
staff, serving and retired judges, have called attention to a certain disquiet that the
concept of ``equitable geographical distribution'' embodied in Article 9 is in fact unfair,
``petrifying'' power balances of the Charter era and strongly favouring Europe (including
the geopolitically obsolete ``Eastern European Group'') to the detriment of Asia and other
regions. That concept also applies, of course, in relation to the Security Council: see Article
23 of the UN Charter.
78
Ibid., at 26-7 recounting how an ICJ judge explained feeling like an ``ambassador'' of his State
at times.
79 G. de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure (Masson, 1989), at 157; and as he points out,
this is in fact in perfect harmony with the representational condition found in Article 9 of
the ICJ Statute, supra note 28.
80
Cf. the concerns over judicial independence expressed by E. Benvenisti and G.W. Downs,
`Prospects for the Increased Independence of International Courts and Tribunals', (2011) 12(5)
German Law Journal 1057; Cogan, supra note 2; A. von Bogdandy & I. Venzke, `In Whose
Name? An Investigation of International Courts' Public Authority and its Democratic
Justification', (2012) 23 (1) EJIL 7; and R. Mackenzie & P. Sands, `International Courts and
Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge', (2003) 44 Harv. Int'l L.J 271.
81 C. Paulson, `Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice Since
1987', (2004) 98 AJIL 434, at 436-59, established that, of the fourteen cases filed since 1987,
nine have been complied with in full and five have met with ``partial compliance''. See,
generally, C. Schulte, Compliance with the Decisions of the International Court (OUP, 2004). Cf.
Posner and Yoo, supra note 5, at 37 who claim that despite a compliance rate of 85.7% in cases
brought to the Court via compromis, the rate falls to 60% in cases brought via compromissory
clause and 40% in cases brought by way of the Optional Clause mechanism.
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is State-centric, in the sense that it assigns a high value to considerations of State
sovereignty and consent when ascertaining rules of international law.
3.4 Allegations of partiality, or of national/political
bias
As noted above, the most controversial and damaging accusation levelled
against judges of the Court is that they are guilty of partiality, or of national
or political bias; and numerous academic studies have been devoted to either
proving or disproving this very point.82 Consideration of bias is not easily
discernible from the Court's judgments, as it has not made many statements
regarding the requirement of impartiality and conscientiousness embodied
in Article 20 of its Statute,83 and in the various safeguards built into its
Rules.84 However, it may be helpful to consider the experience of other
judicial institutions, especially the Rules of the European Court of Human
Rights,85 and the Code of Judicial Ethics of the International Criminal Court,
82 See supra note 2, for a list of these studies. Mégret, supra note 4, at 48-62 elucidates a list of
factors relevant in assessing the partiality of statements or declarations made by judges, or
experts required to be impartial. Distilled as much as possible, the criteria are as follows: (i)
whether such statements/declarations are sufficiently related to a given case; (ii) whether they
are sufficiently specific as to relate strongly to a case; (iii) whether they are sufficiently recent
in time so as to have weight in assessing the present partiality of the judge; (iv) whether
they are absolute statements, or merely relative (i.e. whether the statement would suggest
that the judge remains open to inquiry or counter-proof); (v) whether the statements are
of a consensual or of a polemical nature, in that they merely restate widely-held positions, or
they arrive at conclusions before investigations have taken place; (vi) whether the statements
represent the taking of a legal position or merely a view about what facts actually occurred;
(vii) whether statements were made in an official capacity, or merely in a private capacity;
(viii) whether the statements are made in an expert (ie as a normative conclusion based on
expertise) or activist (ie as a argumentative position taken within a debate) capacity; (ix)
whether the statement was made in a private or public setting.
83 Article 20 ICJ Statute, supra note 28. Guidance is sparse on this point. It is perhaps telling
that for D.E. Kahn, `Article 20' in Zimmermann et al, supra note 26, at 369, there is no selected
bibliography.
84 The equality of the parties is a consideration that permeates the Rules in general, with
extensive deference to the views of both parties throughout the decision of a case. See
especially the rules regarding the submission of written documents (Articles 44-53), the
conduct of oral proceedings (Articles 54-72), and those relating to the composition of the
Court and the procedures for nominating judges ad hoc (Articles 32-37 of the Rules).
85 Rule 28.2 of the 2012 Rules of the European Court of Human Rights (last amended 1 May
2012) provides that ``a judge may not take part in the consideration of any case if … he or she
has expressed opinions publicly, through the communications media, in writing, through his
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both of which place a high emphasis on the appearance of impartiality.86
One might also wish to consider the ICTY's Furundžija judgment, issued in
response to the defendant's attempt to disqualify the presiding trial judge,
FlorenceMumba, on the basis of her prior membership of the UNCommission
on the Status of Women. Mr Furundžija claimed that the trial judgment
was used by Judge Mumba to promote the legal and political agenda of
that Commission. 87 Rejecting this submission, the Tribunal elaborated a
relatively broad interpretation of the similar requirement of ``impartiality and
integrity''88 contained in its Statute, placing an emphasis on the ``appearance
of impartiality.''89 The Special Court for Sierra Leone has also moved towards
this broader standard, suggesting that the apprehension of bias by a reasonable
bystanderwas legitimate reason to consider that an objective test of impartiality
was not met.90 Extra-judicially, ICTY President Meron has called attention to
the ``importance of being sensitive to the possibility of a public perception of
bias.''91
A contextual analysis of the Court's case law reveals at least two instances
where considerations of impartiality manifested themselves in the opinion of a
member of the Court. Politically, the Nicaragua judgment placed the Court on
or her public actions or otherwise, that are objectively capable of adversely affecting his or
her impartiality.''
86 Article 4, Code of Judicial Ethics, ICC-BD/02-01-05 (adopted 09.03.2005): ``1. Judges shall be
impartial and ensure the appearance of impartiality in the discharge of their judicial functions.
2. Judges shall avoid any conflict of interest, or being placed in a situation which might reasonably
be perceived as giving rise to a conflict of interest'' [Emphasis added].
87
Prosecutor v Furundžija, Judgment of 21 July 2000, Case No IT-95-17/1A, 2002, at 169-70.
88
Ibid., at 189: ``A) A Judge is not impartial if it is shown that actual bias exists; B) There is
an unacceptable appearance of bias if: (i) a Judge is a party to the case, or has a financial
or proprietary interest in the outcome of a case, or if the Judge's decision will lead to the
promotion of a cause in which he or she is involved, together with one of the parties.
Under these circumstances, a Judge's disqualification from the case is automatic; or (ii)
the circumstances would lead a reasonable observer, properly informed, to reasonably
apprehend bias.''
89 Article 13, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, SC Res. 827, UN Docs S/25704/36, annex (1993) and
S/25704/Add.1 (1993), UN Doc S/RES/827, 25 May 1993.
90
Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Decision on Defence Motion Seeking the Disqualification of
Justice Roberston from the Appeals Chamber, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR15, 2004, at 15.
91 Meron, supra note 25, at 362. Although Meron retains faith in international judges acting
in a conscientious, scrupulously impartial manner, he argues that the mere appearance of
bias can compromise the reputation of the judiciary, and as such, must remain a foremost
consideration for judges.
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the defensive after the United States publicly impugned its members for lacking
impartiality, failing to consider ``irrefutable evidence'' and characterising its
judgment as a ``departure from its tradition of judicial restraint.''92 In the merits
phase, Judge Lachs appeared to rebut American accusations levelled against
him:93
A judge—as needs no emphasis—is bound to be impartial, objec-
tive, detached, disinterested and unbiased. In invoking the assis-
tance of this Court or accepting its jurisdiction, States must feel
assured that the facts of the dispute will be properly elicited; they
must have the certainty that their jural relationship will be prop-
erly defined and that no partiality will result in injustice towards
them. Thus those on the bench may represent different schools of
law, may have different ideas about law and justice, be inspired by
conflicting philosophies or travel on divergent roads—as indeed
will often be true of the States parties to a case—and that their
characters, outlook and background will widely differ is virtually
a corollary of the diversity imposed by the Statute. But whatever
philosophy the judges may confess they are bound to ``master the
acts'' and then apply to them the law with utmost honesty.
[…]
This variety of origin is certainly the great strength of this Court. It
is a major contributory factor to the confidence that all states may
feel in the balanced nature of the Court's decisions and the broad
spectrum of legal opinion they represent. But can this diversity
92 18 January 1985 statement of the US State Department, reprinted inM.N. Leich, `Contempo-
rary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law', (1985) 79 AJIL 431, at 440-1,
reprinted in New York Times, 19 January 1985, at 4, cols 1-6.
93 The State Department was unequivocal, ibid.: ``We will not risk US national security by
presenting …material … before a Court that includes two judges fromWarsaw Pact nations.
This problem only confirms the reality that such issues are not suited for the International
Court of Justice.'' Judge Jennings, albeit not directly targeted himself, nevertheless felt
obliged to defend his brethren, inMilitary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v United States), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at 528 ( Judge Jennings,
Dissenting Opinion): ``I also wish to express my regret that, in a Court which by its Statute is
elected in such a way as to assure `the representation of the main forms of civilisation and of
the principal legal systems of the world', the United States in its statement accompanying the
announcement of the non-participation in the present phase of the case should have chosen
not refer to the national origins of two of the Judges who took part in the earlier phases of
the case.''
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justify an invidious distinction between Judges according to their
nationality or the alliances of which their countries may happen
to be members? All Judges ``should not be only impartial but
also independent of control by their own countries or the United
Nations Organization''. In fact, while they may have served their
countries in various capacities, they have had to cut the ties on
becoming a Judge.94
Interestingly, he also cited a former American member of the Court, Judge
Jessup, who had summarily dismissed the notion that the Court's judges
defended their national states, and noted that to prove some kind of national
alignment ``is often not supportable andmay be quitemisleading.''95 Judge Lachs
even took great pains to comment on andmake extensive reference to American
jurists (notably Judges Cardozo, Frankfurter and Holmes), almost certainly to
rebut the accusation of specifically anti-American bias.96
The second example is Judge Elaraby in the Israeli WallOrder of 2004.97 He
quoted Judge Lachs' ``wisemaxim'' approvingly at the start of his opinion, which
was perhaps unnecessary in that he had voted with the majority on the entire
dispositif. However, further study of the historical context behind that Order
reveals that Judge Elaraby had been subject to a complaint by Israel regarding his
impartiality,98 on the basis of his role as a legal adviser to the EgyptianMinistry
of Foreign Affairs and Legal Adviser to the Egyptian Delegation at Camp
David in 1978, as well as an interview given by him in 2001. Although Israel's
94
Nicaragua (Merits), ibid., p. 158, at 158-9 ( Judge Lachs, Separate Opinion). For further
discussion of the `individualisation' of the international judge, see for example Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1952, p. 93, at 161 ( JudgeCarneiro,
Dissenting Opinion) who noted that ``it is inevitable that everyone of us in this Court should
retain some trace of his legal education and his former legal activities in his country of
origin''; and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
1996, p. 226, at 275 [hereinafter `Nuclear Weapons'] ( Judge Herczegh, Declaration).
95
Ibid., at 159.
96 Gordon, supra note 38, at 405. It should be noted that Judge Lachs voted in favour of
the United States in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v
Iran), Provisional Measures ICJ Reports 1979, p. 7, at 44-5; and Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v United States), Order ICJ Reports 1982, p. 3, at 8.
97
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, at 246 [hereinafter `Israeli Wall'] ( Judge Elaraby, Separate
Opinion).
98
Ibid., Order of 30 April 2004 on the Composition of the Court ICJ Reports 2004, p. 3, at
4, para. 2. The exact complaint of Israel was that Judge Elaraby ``had previously played an
active, official and public role as an advocate for a cause that is in contention in [that] case''.
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request was dismissed by thirteen votes to one,99 Judge Buergenthal, the lone
dissentient, openly questioned Judge Elaraby's impartiality in his dissenting
opinion appended to the Order.100 Given a situation where even one of his
own colleagues doubted his capacity to act impartially, one cannot but infer that
Judge Elaraby's separate opinionwasmotivated by the controversy surrounding
him.101
Extra-judicially, Judge Schwebel has proffered the following explanation
about the (lack of) impartiality demonstrated by international judges which,
in the light of criticism of some of his votes in Nicaragua, takes a discernibly
defensive tone:
``We [judges] are all prisoners of our own experience. Suchmeasure
of objectivity as may be humanly possible may comemore easily to
some than others, depending in part on that experience, in which
the legal and political culture that conditioned it is important.
Clearly judges manifest and in the history of civilisation have
manifested a measure of objectivity. If not, the judiciary would
not exist.''102
These rare individual excursions are illustrative of why explicit discussion of




Ibid., ( Judge Buergenthal, Dissenting Opinion), p. 9, para. 11: ``[a] court of law must be free
and, in my opinion, is required to consider whether one of its judges has expressed views or
taken positions that create the impression that hewill not be able to consider the issues raised
in a case or advisory opinion in a fair and impartial manner, that is, that he may be deemed to
have prejudged one or more of the issues bearing on the subject-matter of the dispute before
the court. That is what is meant by the dictum that the fair and proper administration of
justice requires that justice not only be done, but that it also be seen to be done''.
101 Another instancewas arguably JudgeNagendra Singh inNuclear Tests (Australia v France; New
Zealand v France), Judgment ICJ Reports 1974, p. 253, at 457. Dugard, supra note 75, p. 498
contrasted Singh's vote with the majority in December 1974 with his extensive extra-judicial
writings condemning the use of nuclearweapons inwar and their testing as illegal, cautiously
intimating that the fact that India detonated its first nuclear weapon in May 1974 may have
influenced his vote.
102 Schwebel, supra note 2, at 895. Perhaps Judge Schwebel was also responding tomurmurs that
he was guilty of bias, as it should be noted that Judge Schwebel voted as the sole dissentient in
a case involving his national state four times in the Nicaragua case, supra note 93. See Order
on Provisional Measures of 10May 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 169; Order fixing Time-Limits
of 4 October 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 209; Declaration of Intervention, ICJ Reports 1984,
p. 215, and Nicaragua, supra note 93, Jurisdiction, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 392, and once in
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v Italy), ICJ Reports 1989, p. 15.
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above demonstrate that concerns about impartiality colour judicial reasoning
and condition perceptions of the judicial role. Thus, the structural safeguards
built into the Court's Statute103 and the Court's collective drafting procedure—
namely, avoidance of the juge rapporteur104 and the collective drafting process,
the composition of the Court,105 and its election procedures106—seem justified.
Finally, and more concretely, concerns about impartiality are the clear impe-
tus behind the practice of ``conscientious self-disqualification'', when conflict of
interest or undue involvement in other aspects of the dispute may exist.107
103 Articles 16 and 17 of the ICJ Statute, supra note 28, prohibit judges from assuming certain
functions in view of possible conflicts; Article 23 establishes both the right to vacations
and the requirement that judges remain at the disposal of the Court; and Article 32(5)
provides that their salaries may not be decreased whilst they are in office. These constitute
safeguards for the judges against possible institutional interference over selection and tenure,
legal discretion, and control over material and human resources. See R.O. Keohane et
al., `Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational' (2000) 54 International
Organization 457, at 460.
104 Sturé Petrén has extra-judicially listed several factors that made employing a juge rapporteur
unworkable for the Court, going so far as to hint at national bias on the part of the member
of the Court called upon to fulfil that function. See S. Petrén, `Forms of Expression of Judicial
Activity' in L. Gross (ed.), The Future of the International Court of Justice Vol. 2 (Oceana, 1976),
at 448.
105 See Article 9 ICJ Statute, supra note 28, which exhorts the electors to bear in mind the ``body
as a whole''; but cf. L Oppenheim, The Future of International Law (Clarendon Press, 1921),
at 43, arguing that the composition of the Court should not be guided by conceptions of
sovereign equality. An excellent early analysis of the composition of the Court and the
politics of representation remains that of Rosenne, `Composition', supra note 66, at 377. He
exhortsmoving beyond traditional dichotomies between civil law and common law in favour
of a ``judicious balance'' between all legal cultures, rather than any quantitative analysis.
106 Meron, supra note 25, at 362 has called outright for the abolition of electioneering by judges,
and suggested that international courts not allow for the re-election of judges for that same
reason: campaigning is ``incompatible with the dignity of the judicial function''. See also
the suggestion by J. Dugard, `Article 16', in Zimmermann et al, supra note 26, 303, at 313
that longer terms of office, with no possibility of re-election, might further depoliticise
the process; and ABILA Committee for the Settlement of Intergovernmental Disputes,
`Reforming the United Nations: What About the International Court of Justice?', (2006)
5(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 39, at 50, calling for judges to be elected for a single
twelve-year term; Lauterpacht, `Revision', supranote 12, at 122, proposing a single fifteen-year
term.
107 Very little can be abstracted from these practices because the Court is usually content with a
brief statement in its Yearbook, providing little public explanation. One can note, however,
the factual instances of recusals and study the external facts which might explain these
recusals. See for example Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Limited (Belgium
v Spain), Second Phase ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, where an unnamed judge recused himself.
In Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554, there was a
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4 Final Reflections on Impartiality
The notion of judicial impartiality being wedded to concerns over nationality
and bias ignores the indirect stake thatmany states and international actors have
in the judicial pronouncements of the Court. With its increased docket, genuine
concerns over the structural and institutional constraints described above are
ever more salient, and the Court's understanding of its judicial function should
be approached from all possible angles.
The Court might indeed—to paraphrase Allott—speak to states the words
states want to hear.108 Yet even if this is so, that phenomenon ought best to
be understood in the context in which the Court operates, instead of simply
indicting the Court as a biased, subordinate institution. It is true that cannot
always come to a case dispassionately and with only knowledge of the case that
is put before a court. Experienced judges often come to a case with substantial
knowledge of the context or facts surrounding it, and may be chosen precisely
because of this relative legal and political `worldliness'.109 Yet the fact that judges
have convictions and make value judgements, in good faith, in the exercise
of their function is not necessarily problematic:110 the very ability to abstract
problem in that one of the judges in the Chamber had previously presided over a conciliation
commission which attempted to resolve that dispute. Judge Jessup recused himself from the
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), Judgment ICJ Reports 1962, p. 6, in which
he had previously been connected as counsel, as did Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in Nottebohm
(Liechtenstein v Guatemala), Second Phase ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4; the qualités of the judgment
did not mention this fact. When Judge Higgins recused herself in Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom), Judgment ICJ Reports 1998, p. 9, at p. 13, para.
9, she was not mentioned by name. Judge Abraham in Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France), Judgment ICJ Reports 2008, p. 177, at 181-2, para.
6, was referred to as ``the Member of the Court of French nationality.'' Recusal has also
been involuntary: in South West Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa), Second
Phase ICJ Reports 1966, p. 6, President Spender summarily announced at the start of oral
proceedings that Judge Zafrullah Khan had been recused. For a history of this incident,
see W.M. Reisman, `Revision of the South West Africa Cases' (1966), 7 Virginia Journal of
International Law 3, at 55 and Rosenne, `Composition', supra note 66, at 389-90. See R.Y.
Jennings, `Article 24', in Zimmermann et al, supra note 26, at 420-1, footnote 19, for further
examples.
108 P. Allott, The Health of Nations (CUP, 2002), at 296.
109 Meron, supranote 25, at 365: ``judges are not empty vessels that the litigants fill with content.''
See also, generally, J. Frank, `Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of
the Assumption That Judges Behave like Human Beings', (1931) 80 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 17, at 25-9 on the personal element in judicial decision.
110 Dworkin, supra note 11, at 8-9; Thomas, supra note 15, at 242.
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oneself from one's individual predilections and to consider all viewpoints with a
fair, openmind could even feed on one having a `relatively vigorous subjectivity'
in the first instance.111 In short, the very notion of impartiality is relatively
indeterminate.
I suggest instead that the notion of impartiality should be understood
``against a background of partiality'',112 as an understanding by judges that
they do carry with them prior experiences and predispositions that they must
rationalise when making decisions based on law. Far from a praetorian guard
of states' interests, the Court's judges define themselves through their fidelity to
the rules of international law itself.113 The Court's judges perceive the essence of
their role to remain faithful—or partial—to the rules, standards and values that
constitute the legal system.114 As such, the concept of judicial impartiality would
better be conceptualised by ``visualising''115 the judges within the context of the
rules that they apply, rather than to be impartial in respect of the rules that they
apply.116 Rather than to extinguish them fully, judges should strive to remain
aware of pre-judgements and values,117 and retain a ``reflective critical attitude''
to the standards (or rules) they follow, apply and interpret.118 For in the final
analysis, what is asked of judges is good judgement, and not simply a resolution
of the dispute: the judicial role requires constant, discerning assessment of what
the law, and its underpinning purposes, require in a particular case.
111 Mégret, supra note 4, at 44.
112 Lucy, supra note 19, at 15.
113 Meron, supra note 25, at 369 expressly invokes the term ``fidelity.''
114 D. Kennedy, `Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology', (1986)
36 Journal of Legal Education 518, at 522 characterises the interplay between values and these
`pseudo-objective' rules as perhaps one of the major constraining factors on judicial work.
115 J. Dickinson, `Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision', (1931) 79 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 833, at 844 who suggests that one know the ``rule of decision''; that
is, not only the substantive rules in issue, but rather, how judges perceive and implement
the rules, which turns on the judges' views on the function of the law, as well as their own
function.
116 Lucy, supra note 19, at 25.
117 As concludes Minow, supra note 20, at 1217: ``[w]e want judges … to be objective about the
facts and the questions of guilt and innocence but committed to building upon what they
already know about the world, human beings, and each person's own implication in the
lives of others. Pretending not to know risks leaving unexamined the very assumptions that
deserve reconsideration.''
118 Hart, supra note 21, at 57.
